Articles Posted in ACCIDENTS

by

Boston Massachusetts Personal Injury Attorney, the attorney , reviews a recent Supreme Judicial Court case involving an injured police officer:

A Massachusetts police officer who suffered serious personal injuries, while responding to a motor vehicle/pedestrian accident, cannot recover from the hospital, which treated and released the pedestrian just prior to the accident, says the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

Thumbnail image for eps_mg-182.jpgIn November, 2004, the Brockton, Massachusetts police officer, was responding to a car accident involving a pedestrian, While driving to the accident scene, the officer’s police cruiser was struck by another vehicle resulting in serious and permanent injuries to the officer. He was responding to an accident in which an individual just released from Brockton Hospital had been struck and killed by a motor vehicle.

The patient had undergone a colonoscopy at the hospital earlier in the day and had been given Demerol and Versed, both narcotic sedatives. The hospital had a written policy, which prevented patients who had been given narcotics from being discharged without an escort. This patient left the hospital with no escort.

The Plaintiff police officer had alleged that the hospital was negligent and had a duty of care to protect third parties from harm caused by its “impaired” patients. The officer claimed that the hospital had a special medical relationship with its patient prior to him leaving the premises, which created a duty to control the patient’s conduct in order to protect against harm the patient might cause to others, even after the patient had been discharged.

Continue reading

by

June 16, 2009: Diya Patel, a 4-year-old Stoughton, Massachusetts girl, died early Sunday morning as the result of serious personal injuries after being struck by a car on Wahington Street in Stoughton, Massachusetts on Saturday. The girl was hit on Route 138 while she crossing the street on her scooter. She was in a crosswalk and accompanied by her grandfather and siblings. She was transported to Tufts medical center after a nurse and off duty firefighter at the scene had attempted to revive her by performing CPR on the child.

The driver has been identified as Ilse R. Horn who resides in senior community housing in Canton. The Stoughton police announced today that it would be summoning her to Stoughton District Court on charges of vehicular homicide, negligent operation of a motor vehicle, driving to endanger and failure to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk. The RMV revoked her operator’s license today, saying she was a safety threat.

Stoughton Police investigated and were reconstructing the accident. There were no skidmarks and it appears that  the 88-year-old driver never saw the girl. The speed limit along that section of Washington Street is 35 mph. Investigators allege that Horn was driving a Toyaota Camry and was not speeding when the child was hit.

by

Marcello Ventrella, and Aram J. Pothier, respectively of Bellingham and Blackstone, Massachusetts, have died as the result of personal injuries suffered after a night of teenage drinking. They were passengers in a motor vehicle driven by Robert Baez, who was seriously injured, but survived the accident. The accident took place on I-295 in Smithfield, Rhode Island. Both of the deceased were riding in the backseat, were not wearing seatbelts and were pronounced dead at the scene.  The fourth passenger, Christopher J. Cuomo, escaped without serious injuries.

The young men began their night in Massachusetts, but allegedly ventured to a Providence, Rhode Island bar, where it appears they were served alcohol.  Rhode Island State Police are still investigating the details of the accident and the events preceding the accident. However, it appears that all four of the young men had been drinking and were served in the bar, as yet unidentified.

The obvious question arises as to who is ultimately responsible for this tragic accident. Baez, the young driver, of course is the primary responsible party. However, the tougher question is whether others can and should be held responsible for the condition he was in at the time of the accident. Given that all four were underage, including Baez, if it is true that he was served at a public drinking establishment, the owners of that bar may bear some responsibility for the accident.

The law with respect to the responsibility and liability of public establishments, which are licensed to serve alcohol is well established in Massachusetts and Rhode Island,  “Dram shop liability” arises when bars and liquor stores negligently serve alcohol to underage or noticeably intoxicated individuals.  This requires proof that the bar knew or should have known that the customer who drove a vehicle was intoxicated.

A traditional dram shop case involves an innocent injured third party such as the driver of another vehicle or somewhat walking down the street.  The fact that the claimant in this instance  were passengers in the vehicle, may have also been drinking themselves, and likely knew that Baez also had been drinking. Such facts may raise issues of comparative negligence, but does not bar recovery for the families of the deceased young men who died in this accident.

Source: Bostonchannel.com


 

 

 

 

Continue reading

by

Daniel Tourville, a 24-year-old Ware man was in serious condition early Monday afternoon at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center in Worcester after losing control of his motorcycle. Incredibly, Tourville was not wearing a helmet at the time of the accident. Apparently, Tourville drove off the road, hitting a tree stump and utility pole. He was initially taken to Baystate Mary Lane Hospital, and then airlifted to the U. Mass. Medical Center in Worcester. Police are investigating the accident.


motorcycle helmet.jpgStatistics indicate that the use of helmets saves lives and prevents brain injuries. According to the NHTSA, in 2007 motorcycle helmets saved 1,784 lives. NHTSA says that if all motorcyclists had worn helmets, 800 more lives would have been saved. Helmets are estimated to be 37 percent effective in preventing fatal injuries and 67 percent effective in preventing brain injuries.nd prevents brain injury.

See Masslive.com

by

Boston Personal Injury Lawyer, the attorney, analyzes a recent Appeals Court decision pertaining to double penalties under the Worken’s Compensation Act.

The case involves a store employee who suffered serious personal injuries after falling through a trap door in the floor of a floral shop, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has reversed a decision by the Department of Industrial Accidents reviewing board that awarded an employee double compensation (under Mass. G.L. c. 152, § 28), finding that the employee’s injury was due to the serious and wilful misconduct of the employer. The Appeals Court determined that the record did not support a finding that the employer’s conduct rose to the level of a wanton and reckless disregard for safety.

trap door.jpgThe employee was working at a floral shop on Valentines day in 1991 when she fell into a trap-door floor opening, which covered a set of stairs leading down to the cellar. She fell into the hole sustaining serious personal injuries. The floor door measured approximately eight feet by three feet, and qualified as a “floor opening”, which made it subject to the state and federal regulations, and certain mandatory safeguards.

The employer was not aware of the regulations, and instead relied on its own warning system of orange safety cones and chains to warn and protect the employees. However, the system was only used sporadically, and was not in place on the day of the accident. There was also some evidence that there may have been insufficient floor space in the area of the trap door due to the placement of a table for completed work orders. There was also evidence that because it was Valentine’s day, the work pace in the store was much heavier than normal.

Continue reading

by

This is Part Two of a two part Blogpost where Boston Personal Injury Lawyer, the attorney, reviews and analyzes a recent First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruling, in which an insurer sought a declaration that there was no coverage for an personal injuries as the result of an accident involving a contract worker who severed his arm in a wool picking machine. The worker had sued the Massachusetts recycling company where he had been working for a number of months. (Click here to view Part One)

PART TWO :  THE COURT ANALYZES DISTINCTION BETWEEN “LEASED WORKER” AND “TEMPORARY WORKER” IN POLICY TO DETERMINE COVERAGE

Having reviewed the underlying facts of the case, the Court went on to analyze the express language of the insurance policy, attempting to discern whether the lower court had correctly determined that the the worker’s contract was indefinite and therefore not temporary, which was its basis for ruling that there was no coverage for the accident.

wool baling machine.jpgIn the policy a leased worker was defined as a person leased to you by a labor leasing firm under an agreement between you and the labor leasing firm, to perform duties related to the conduct of your business. A temporary worker was defined as a person who is furnished to you to substitute for a permanent “employee” on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions.

The question then for the Court of Appeals was whether Torres was a “leased worker,” and thus excluded from coverage; or a “temporary worker,” thus obligating Scottsdale to provide a defense and coverage in Torres’s lawsuit. The district court had determined that Torres was not a temporary worker on the basis that the term “short term” worker, though not defined in the policy, suggested a brief and relatively finite period of time.

Based on deposition testimony of CTC’s president that Torres was to stay at CTC “for as long as he was needed”, and a Venturi manager’s testimony that Torres was assigned to CTC “indefinitely,” the lower court determined  that “indefinite” and “short-term” were mutually exclusive, that Torres’ stay with CTC was indefinite and that he was therefore not a “temporary worker”. Therefore his claim was not covered under the policy.

Continue reading

by

In this two part Blogpost, Boston Accident Lawyer, the attorney, reviews and analyzes a First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals decision, which considers insurance coverage issues for an accident involving a man whose arm was severed in a wool picking machine, while engaged as a contract worker for a Western Massachusetts recycling company.

PART ONE :  PERSONAL INJURIES FROM CONTRACT WORKER’S SEVERED ARM MAY NOT BE COVERED BY INSURANCE

On August 23, 2004, Raul Torres suffered serious personal injuries when his arm was severed in a wool picking machine while working at Carrabassett Trading Company  “CTC”) in North Oxford, Massachusetts. CTC is a recycling company, which collects and recycles waste fiber from textile mills, bales up the material and sells them to other manufacturers.

wool picking machine.jpgTorres was not an employee of CTC. Rather, his services were provided to CTC by his employer, Venturi Staffing Company, Inc (“Venturi”). Because CTC has an inconsistent demand for its products, it hires such contract workers to supplement its permanent staff of five. Torres filed suit against CTC in Massahusetts state court.

CTC’s insurer filed a federal court action seeking a declaration that there was no coverage for the injuries due to “employer” exceptions in the company’s liability policy. The Court reversed a district court ruling in favor of the insurer, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Continue reading

by

(This Boston Accident and Injury Lawyer Blogpost is the Last in a Three Part Analysis of a Recent U.S. Appeals Court Ruling involving defamation, public officials and the news media Click here to view Part One and Click Here to view Part Two)

PART THREE : THE COURT RULES ON THE DEFAMATORY BROADCAST

As stated previously, under Maine common law, a plaintiff alleging defamation must show a false and defamatory statement published without privilege to a third party resulting in harm to the plaintiff.

HAMSTEAK.jpgIn the lower court proceeding, the defendants had contended that the various statements made on the show and attributed to Levesque either were not defamatory or, because Levesque had stipulated that he was a public official, it could not be shown that they were made with actual malice. The district court held that the statements were protected on multiple grounds. It found the “hate crime” comments substantially true and mention of the “anti-ham response plan” protected as “rhetorical hyperbole”.

However, the lower court determined that the ham sandwich and the “ham is not a toy” comments were materially false, reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, and highly offensive. Yet the court believed that Levesque had failed to demonstrate that the defendants had acted with constitutional malice when they made the defamatory comments.

The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that most, but not all of the statements attributed to the Plaintiff were largely true, although laced with “imaginative expression” or “rhetorical hyperbole”, which it concluded were protected speech.

Continue reading

by

This Blogpost by Boston Personal Injury and Accident Laywer, the attorney, anaylzes a battle between insurers over costs of construction accident.

Following a construction site accident where an insurer of a subcontractor refused to defend the general contractor, who then successfully filed a declaratory action to force the subcontractor’s insurer to share in the defense and settlement costs of the action, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has refused to permit the general’s insurer to recover the attorney’s fees incurred in successfully bringing its declaratory judgment action.
 
zurich.jpgIn January of 2001 a worker fell and suffered injuries while employed on a project in Uxbridge, Massachusetts. A year later he brought a negligence action against the general contractor and another subcontractor on the project. The general contractor was insured under a general liability insurance policy with Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich). The subcontractor also had a policy issued by Worcester Insurance Company (Worcester), and was required by contract to list the general as an additional insured.

Upon filing of the complaint, the general called upon the subcontractor and Worcester to defend. They refused and Zurich defended. Zurich also brought a declaratory judgment action in the general’s name, seeking indemnification from the subcontractor and Worcester for their refusal to defend. Ultimately, the negligence case settled, with the general contributing $75,000 to the settlement.

The general contractor prevailed in the declaratory judgment action and Worcester was ordered to pay one half of both the settlement amount and the costs of defending the negligence action. However, the general contractor also sought an award of the attorney’s fees incurred to file and prevail in the declaratory judgment action, even though it was evident that it was Zurich who had paid the fees. The Superior Court judge denied the request and the general contractor appealed.

The SJC affirmed and discussed at length its reasoning. Massachusetts generally follows the customary approach to the award of attorney’s fees in civil litigation, known as the “American Rule”. In the absence of some statute or other rule, successful litigants must nonetheless pay their own attorney’s fees and expenses.

Continue reading

by

(This is the second post of a blog, from Boston Personal Injury Lawyer, the attorney, which considers protections afforded under a Massachusetts statute intended to protect non-profit entities from liability from accidental personal injury)

PART TWO – GL C. 231, S. 85V CONSIDERED

General Laws c. 231, § 85V limits the liability of non profit sports programs to third parties for accidents and injuries arising from the conduct of such programs. However, the limit on liability is not absolute. Specifically, liability can arise for conduct relating to the care and maintenance of real estate which the association uses in connection with a sports program or related activity (G.L. c. 231, § 85V(iii)).

goal-post2.jpgThe Plaintiff articulated two reasons why the immunity provided by the statute should not apply to his facts. First, he contended that the statute did not apply because he was neither a participant, nor a spectator at an organized game or practice at the time of the accident. The Court rejected this theory on the basis that the immunity was not controlled by the status of the individual who was injured, but rather on the question of what was the status of the organization. If the injury arose from the conduct of the sports program, the immunity applied. Here, the placement of the goal posts on the field was irrefutably a part of the conduct of its soccer program.

The Plaintiff also contended that the real estate exception in the statute imposed liability on the association. He argued that the associations were negligent in their care and maintenance of Haskell Field by permitting improperly secured goal posts to be present on the property, and that this dangerous condition caused him serious harm. The Court rejected this argument, and an analysis that followed the common law duty of landowners to invitees with regard to unnatural and dangerous conditions on the premises.

Continue reading

Contact Information